

## Message Text

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CIAE-00 ( ISO ) W

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P 081500Z AUG 78

FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7544

INFO USMISSION USUN NY PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 BELGRADE 5793

EXDIS

EO 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, PFOR, YO

SUBJ: THE BELGRADE NONALIGNED FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE AND  
YUGOSLAVIA: EMBASSY ASSESSMENT

1. THIS IS AN ATTEMPT AT AN ANALYSIS OF THE BELGRADE  
NA CONFERENCE AS SEEN FROM THIS EMBASSY. IT FOCUSSES ON  
YUGOSLAVIA AND ITS ROLE AS WE SEE IT, BUT MAY HAVE SOME  
WIDER APPLICABILITY.

I. THE MAJOR ISSUE.

2. WHO WON? SINCE EVERY ANALYSIS WE HAVE SEEN  
RAISES THIS QUESTION WE WILL -- ALTHOUGH IT IS AN  
OVERSIMPLIFICATION -- START WITH IT. TO THE YUGOSLAVS  
THERE WAS ONE MAJOR ISSUE: THE ATTEMPT BY THE CUBANS  
TO REORIENT NONALIGNMENT TOWARD CLOSER IDENTIFICATION  
WITH THE SOVIET BLOC, ITS "NATURAL ALLY," AND IN THE  
PROCESS SEIZE THE "LEADERSHIP" OF THE NAM. SUBORDINATE  
TO THIS QUESTION, AND VERY MUCH A CONSEQUENCE OF IT,  
WERE TWO OTHER ISSUES:

A. HOW TO DEAL WITH INTERVENTION BY ONE NONALIGNED  
STATE IN THE AFFAIRS OF ANOTHER.

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B. THE "DEMOCRATIZATION" OF THE COORDINATING BUREAU.

3. ON THE MAJOR QUESTION, THE DEFINITION OR ORIENTATION  
OF THE NAM, THE YUGOSLAVS THINK THEY WON, AND SO  
DO I. AT THE SAME TIME, WHAT THEY WON IN BELGRADE WAS  
A BATTLE, NOT THE WAR; THE CONTEST OVER THE DEFINITION  
OF NONALIGNMENT (AND THEREFORE THE QUESTION OF NAM  
LEADERSHIP) WILL BE FOUGHT AGAIN IN HAVANA. THE  
"MODERATES" AT BELGRADE WERE WELL ORGANIZED, MORE  
VOCAL IN DEFENSE OF THEIR POSITIONS THAN HAS USUALLY

BEEN THE CASE IN SUCH CONFERENCES, AND WON MOST OF THE CONTESTS (E.G., USE OF THE WORD "HEGEMONY") WHEN THE ISSUE WAS THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIENTATION OF THE MOVEMENT. FOR THE YUGOSLAVS THIS "VICTORY" WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE THEY VIEW THE CHALLENGE MOUNTED BY THE CUBANS -- ACTING AS SOVIET SURROGATES -- AS THE MOST CONCERTED ATTACK FROM WITHIN THE MOVEMENT ON THEIR VERSION OF NONALIGNMENT SINCE THE NAM WAS FOUNDED. AND THEY MANAGED THEIR SUCCESS WITHOUT, AT LEAST OUTWARDLY, VIOLATING THE HOLY OF HOLIES, NA UNITY.

4. ON THE SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS OF INTERVENTION AND REFORM OF THE COORDINATING BUREAU THE BEST THE YUGOSLAVS COULD GET WAS A DRAW.

A. WHILE ORIGINALLY SYMPATHETIC TO CUBAN INTERVENTION IN AFRICAN, THE GOY HAS, OVER THE COURSE OF THE PAST YEAR, SHIFTED ITS VIEW BY ABOUT 180 DEGREES. THE REASONS FOR THIS CHANGE ARE COMPLICATED AND LARGELY IRRELEVANT TO THIS ANALYSIS; WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS THE FACT THAT THE YUGOSLAVS ARE NOW -- AND HAVE BEEN FOR SOME MONTHS -- ANXIOUS TO CONTAIN AND EVENTUALLY ELIMINATE THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN AFRICA. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT THEIR VIEW IS NOT WHOLLY SECRET

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SHARED BY MANY OTHER (PARTICULARLY AFRICAN) NAM STATES. GIVEN THIS DIFFERENCE OF PERSPECTIVE, THEY SOUGHT TO SQUARE THE CIRCLE WITH A FINAL DOCUMENT FORMULATION THAT, WHILE RECOGNIZING THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF A STATE TO ASK FOR OUTSIDE HELP, ALSO DISCOURAGED NON-ALIGNED STATES FROM DOING SO. NOT SURPRISINGLY, THIS ATTEMPT RAN INTO IMMEDIATE TROUBLE. WHEN THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE BEGAN TO DISCUSS LANGUAGE THAT TALKED ABOUT THE "INTERNATIONALIST DUTY" OF INTERVENING TO ASSIST NAM STATES THE YUGOSLAVS HASTILY DROPPED THE MATTER. THEY DID SO FOR REASONS UNRELATED TO THEIR NA CONCERNS, BUT VERY MUCH A PART OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET BLOC. HAVING ARDENTLY RESISTED FOR SOME YEARS THE VIEW THAT ONE "SOCIALIST" STATE HAS A RIGHT AND OBLIGATION TO INTERVENE IN ANOTHER SOCIALIST STATE WHEN THE SYSTEM IS THREATENED, THEY COULD NOT

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FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE  
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ACCEPT WITH EQUANIMITY UNCOMFORTABLY SIMILAR REFERENCES  
IN A NON-ALIGNED DOCUMENT. YET, DESPITE THEIR FAILURE  
TO GET FINAL DOCUMENT LANGUAGE TO THEIR LIKING,  
SUFFICIENT DEBATE WAS GENERATED ON THE  
QUESTION TO DEMONSTRATE TO HAVANA THAT THERE WAS GROWING  
CONCERN ABOUT CUBA'S ACTIVITIES IN AFRICA. THE  
CUBANS CERTAINLY GOT THE MESSAGE; WHETHER THEY WILL  
DO ANYTHING ABOUT IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

B. SO FAR AS COORDINATING BUREAU REFORM (I.E.,  
REDUCING CUBA'S ABILITY TO USE THE BUREAU FOR ITS OWN  
ENDS) IS CONCERNED, THE GOY WAS PARTIALLY SUCCESSFUL. THE  
BELGRADE FINAL DOCUMENT REFERS TO THE SUBJECT, AND  
THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT AN NA WORKING GROUP IN  
NEW YORK WILL EXAMINE THE QUESTION FURTHER. LITTLE  
SHOULD BE EXPECTED BETWEEN NOW AND HAVANA BEYOND A  
DEFINITION OF THE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT, BUT THE DISCUSSION  
ITSELF MAY HAVE A MODERATING EFFECT ON CUBAN  
BEHAVIOR OVER THE COMING MONTHS.

## II. REGIONAL ISSUES

5. THE YUGOSLAVS WERE ONLY marginally INTERESTED IN THE  
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DEBATES WITHIN THE REGIONAL CAUCUSES, SO LONG AS  
THE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FINAL DOCUMENT AVOIDED OR  
DOWNPLAYED DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN MEMBER STATES. THEY  
DIDWORK HARD AND SUCCESSFULLY, HOWEVER, TO GET ALL  
THE ARAB STATES TO DEVELOP AND AGREE ON A MIDDLE EAST  
TEXT. THE RESULT WAS A DOCUMENT HEAVILY CRITICAL OF  
THE U.S. AND REplete WITH REFERENCES TO THE ZIONISM-  
RACISM LINKAGE. AS AT THE EARLIER HAVANA COORDINATING  
BUREAU MEETING, MUCH OF THE EXPLANATION FOR THE ANTI-  
U.S. TONE LIES IN THE FACT THAT WE WERE THE CONVENIENT  
SURROGATE FOR EGYPT, WHICH WAS THE REAL TARGET OF THE  
RADICAL ARAB STATES. (NON-ALIGNED DIPLOMATS HERE TELL  
ME THAT BY PLAYING A LARGELY SILENT GAME WITHIN THE  
ARAB CAUCUS THE EGYPTIANS SUCCEEDED IN STRENGTHENING  
THEIR NON-ALIGNED CREDENTIALS, WHICH HAD BEEN BADLY  
DAMAGED BY SADAT'S CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.  
AND HIS RECENT UNILATERAL MOVES TOWARD ISRAEL.)

6. ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AS INDEED WITH THE OTHER

REGIONAL CHAPTERS OF THE FINAL DOCUMENT, THE YUGOSLAVS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE PREFERRED MORE MODERATE LANGUAGE (THEIR ORIGINAL DRAFT WOULD SEEM TO CONFIRM THIS) FOR TWO REASONS:

A. THE GOY HAS BECOME, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NEVER ADMIT IT, A "MODERATE" (IN NAM TERMS) ON MANY INTERNATIONAL ISSUES. THIS IS PARTLY A CONSEQUENCE OF AGE (BOTH OF TITO AND THE REGIME), AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF ITS SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER STAGE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. BUT, MOST OF ALL, IT IS BECAUSE OF YUGOSLAVIA'S WORSENING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CONVICTION THAT CUBA IS NOT ACTING ON ITS OWN.

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B. A WORRY THAT THE COURSE OF YUGOSLAVIA'S IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. COULD BE AFFECTED BY A STRIDENTLY ANTI-AMERICAN TONE.

7. BUT WITH THIS SAID, THE GOY WAS NOT ABOUT TO DISPUTE WITH ANY OF THE REGIONAL CAUCUSES. HAVING ALREADY BEEN CHARGED BY THE CUBANS AS SOMETHING AKIN TO RUNNING DOGS OF IMPERIALISM BECAUSE OF THEIR BATTLE OVER THE DEFINITION OF NON-ALIGNMENT, THE YUGOSLAVS WERE NOT READY TO ADD SUBSTANCE TO THE CHARGE BY TRYING TO TAKE THE EDGE OFF EXTREME LANGUAGE ON ISSUES OF LESS THAN CRITICAL CONCERN TO THEM. HAVING DONE THE BEST THEY COULD ON WHAT THEY CONSIDERED THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS, THEY WOULD HAVE ACCEPTED A FUDGE RECIPE IN THE MIDDLE OF THE REGIONAL CHAPTERS IF THAT HAD BEEN WHAT THEIR FELLOW MEMBERS WANTED. LUCKILY, THE KHARTOUM MEETING LARGELY SET THE TONE FOR THE AFRICAN SECTION; ON THE MIDDLE EAST THE GOY BASICALLY AGREES, ANYWAY, THAT SADAT MOVED UNWISELY AND THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE THE REAL VILLAINS OF THE PIECE. ON LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES THEY COULD CARE LESS, AND KNEW THAT THEY COULD, WITH SOME JUSTICE, BLAME THE PUERTO RICO ABSURDITY ON CUBA AND THE SILENCE OF OUR LATIN AMERICAN NON-ALIGNED "FRIENDS".

III. CHANGING THE LOCUS OF THE 1979 SUMMIT AND EXPULSION OF CUBA.

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EXDIS

8. THERE WAS MUCH SPECULATION BEFORE THE BELGRADE MEETING THAT THE NAM MIGHT MOVE THE VENUE OF THE 1979 SUMMIT MEETING FROM HAVANA. THERE WAS EVEN SOME TALK ABOUT EXPELLING CUBA FROM THE NAM. YET NEITHER WAS REMOTELY POSSIBLE: INDEED, THE GOY MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WOULD BE IN THE FOREFRONT OF THOSE OPPOSING EITHER ACTION. THE YUGOSLAV REASONS WERE CLEAR, AND FROM THE POINT-OF-VIEW OF THOSE WHO WISH TO MAINTAIN THE NAM AS A VIABLE FORCE, PROBABLY CORRECT. THE YUGOSLAVS BELIEVED, AND STILL BELIEVE, THAT TO EXPEL CUBA, EVEN WERE THAT "CONSTITUTIONALLY" OR POLITICALLY POSSIBLE, WOULD BE THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR NON-ALIGNMENT. ONCE SUCH A STEP WERE TAKEN THERE WOULD BE NO END TO POSSIBLE VARIATIONS ON THE THEME (VIET NAM VS. KAMPUCHEA, ALGERIA VS. MOROCCO, SOMALIA VS ETHIOPIA, TO NAME BUT A FEW). TO HAVE MOVED THE 1979 MEETING FROM HAVANA WOULD HAVE BEEN ALMOST EQUALLY REPUGNANT, SINCE IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SEEN AS AN OPEN ADMISSION OF UNBRIDGEABLE DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE NAM. FOR COUNTRIES SUCH AS YUGOSLAVIA THAT HAVE MADE NON-ALIGNMENT A KEY-STONE OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICY (AND NONE CAN MATCH THE GOY IN THIS RESPECT), THERE CAN BE NO MORE DEVASTATING PROSPECT THAN THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE MOVEMENT; IT IS SOMETHING THAT YUGOSLAVIA, AT LEAST, WILL PAY A HIGH SECRET

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PRICE TO AVOID.

IV. FROM BELGRADE TO HAVANA.

9. IT IS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT WHAT WILL COME FROM THE HAVANA SUMMIT NEXT YEAR. BUT SOME GUESSES CAN BE MADE, FROM THE YUGOSLAV PERSPECTIVE, ABOUT THE INTERVENING PERIOD.

A. FIRST, THE YUGOSLAVS EXPECT TO HAVE TO FIGHT ALL OVER AGAIN BEFORE AND AT HAVANA THE IDEOLOGICAL BATTLE, AND THIS TIME IN AN UNFRIENDLY ENVIRONMENT AND WITH FIDEL CASTRO IN THE CHAIR.

B. SECOND, THE YUGOSLAVS ARE CONVINCED THT THE STRENGTH OF THE "MODERATES" WILL BE INFLUENCED BY WORLD EVENTS OVER THE COURSE OF THE NEXT YEAR. IF THINGS GO WELL IN NAMIBIA AND BETWEEN ANGOLA AND

ZAIRE, FOR EXAMPLE, THE BLACK AFRICAN STATES ARE, THEY BELIEVE, LIKELY TO BE LESS AMENABLE TO CUBAN POWER PLAYS. BUT IF THINGS GO BADLY, THEN THE CUBAN HAND WILL BE STRENGTHENED. SO, ALSO, WITH THE MIDDLE EAST. AND THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE ALREADY WARNED ME THAT THE WEST CAN EXPECT HEIGHTENED, AND ALMOST UNIVERSALLY ENDORSED, CRITICISM IN THE AREA OF THE NIEO, WHERE NO ONE IS SATISFIED WITH WHAT HAS BEEN OR IS LIKELY TO BE OFFERED.

C. FINALLY, THE YUGOSLAVS WILL CAMPAIGN HARD TO ORGANIZE THE MODERATES. THEY WERE CONSTRAINED BEFORE AND DURING THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE BY THEIR ROLE AS HOST; THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE FAR LESS SUBTLE NOW. THEY DO NOT, AT THIS EARLY STAGE SEEM PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE OUTCOME, BUT THEY INTEND TO DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO  
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PERSUADE STATES TO BE REPRESENTED AT HAVANA, EVEN IF HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DO NOT THEMSELVES APPEAR. THE WORST POSSIBLE OUTCOME, AS THE GOY NOW SEES IT, WOULD BE FOR THE ANTI-CUBANS TO STAY AWAY, LEAVING THE FIELD TO CASTRO AND WHATEVER TRUNCATED VERSION OF THE NAM HE COULD PULL TOGETHER. WERE THAT TO OCCUR, THE MOVEMENT WOULD BE LARGELY IN THE HANDS OF THE CUBANS FOR THE NEXT THREE YEARS (UNTIL THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT), SOMETHING THE GOY WILL GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO PREVENT. (BUT AT THE SAME TIME, THEY ARE ALREADY HEDGING THEIR BETS, AS INDICATED BY A REMARK TO ME LAST WEEK BY A SENIOR YUGOSLAV OFFICIAL THAT WHILE THE GOY INTENDS TO GO TO HAVANA, IT IS AN INTENTION THAT "MIGHT CHANGE." THAT IS THE FIRST TIME WE HAVE EVER HEARD SUCH AN ADMISSION; IT IS AN OPTION I WOULD NOT RATE AS LIKELY TO BE EXERCISED BUT TITO MIGHT STAY HOME.)

V. THE MEANING OF BELGRADE FOR THE NAM.

10. NON-ALIGNED UNITY IS, FOR YUGOSLAVIA, VIRTUALLY A SINE QUA NON, AND THEREIN MAY LIE BOTH HER MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON AGAINST CUBA OVER THE NEXT THIRTEEN MONTHS, AS WELL AS HER GREATEST WEAKNESS. IF THE EXTENT OF THE YUGOSLAV-CUBAN DEBATE BEFORE AND DURING BELGRADE

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EXDIS

HAS ANY SIGNIFICANCE, IT IS THAT THE DISPUTE OVER THE FUTURE OF NON-ALIGNMENT HAS TAKEN ON A VIRULENCE UNKNOWN IN THE HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT. AND BARRING A SHIFT OF SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTIONS IN CUBAN POLICY (AND THEIR ACTIONS AT BELGRADE GAVE NO HINT OF SUCH A CHANGE), THERE IS REASON TO ASSUME THE BATTLE WILL GET WORSE, NOT BETTWE. THUS, TO THE DEGREE THAT THE GOY CAN ARGUE THAT CUBA -- BY HER EFFORTS TO ALIGN THE NAM WITH THE SOVIET BLOC, AND HER ARMED INVOLVEMENT IN DISPUTES BETWEEN NAM STATES -- IS THREATENING THE UNITY OF THE MOVEMENT, IT WILL HAVE A STRONG HAND TO PLAY.

11. BUT THT SAME EMPHASIS ON UNITY MAY PROVE TO BE A LIMITATION ON THE YUGOSLAVS THAT WILL NOT SIMILARLY CONSTRAIN THE CUBANS. IF THE LATTER ARE PREPARED TO SEE THE NAM SPLIT RATHER THAN COMPROMISE, THEN THEY HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL WEAPON IN THEIR HANDS. FACED WITH THE RISK OF A DIVISION, THE YUGOSLAVS MIGHT ACCEPT RELATIVELY WILLINGLY A SCENARIO WHICH LEAVES CUBA ISOLATED WITH ONLY A HANDFUL OF RADICAL STATES FOR COMPANY. THE GOY WOULD, HOWEVER, GO TO CONSIDERABLE LENGTHS -- BUT CERTAINLY WELL SHORT OF ACCEPTING ANY EFFECTIVE TIE TO THE SOVIET BLOC -- TO AVOID A WIDER SPLIT.

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12. I DO NOT SUGGEST THAT THE NAM HAS REACHED SUCH A STATE; I DOUBT THAT IT HAS OR WILL. BUT THE MAKINGS ARE THERE, AND THE YUGOSLAVS ARE BOTH ANGRY AND UNCERTAIN ABOUT CUBAN--AND SOVIET-- INTENTIONS. AND THEY ARE CONVINCED (AS I SUSPECT ARE SOME OTHERS) THAT THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER TO NON-ALIGNMENT COMES FROM THE EAST, NOT THE WEST--NO MATTER WHAT THE RHETORIC THEY SUBSCRIBE TO IN FINAL DOCUMENTS. IT IS A RECOGNITION THAT CAN HAVE -- AND MAY ALREADY HAVE HAD-- SOME FAIRLY PROFOUND EFFECTS ON U.S.-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS.

13. ONE FINAL WORD BEFORE TURNING TO THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U. S. POLICY: TITO. THE FACT THAT THE JULY CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE IN BELGRADE, AND THAT TITO SPOKE, HAD A SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT ON THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE OVER THE CHARACTER OF NON-ALIGNMENT. TITO'S TOUGH SPEECH MADE IT HARD FOR THE CUBANS TO ATTACK HIS CONCEPTS WITOUT SEEMING TO ATTACK, AS WELL, THE MAN

HIMSELF.

14. TITO HAS TAKEN THE CUBAN CAMPAIGN PERSONALLY, AS DEMONSTRATED BY HIS RECENT CONVERSATION WITH GOVERNOR HARRIMAN ("WHRE WAS CASTRO WHEN WE STARTED THE MOVEMENT?"). SO LONG AS HE IS AROUND, YUGOSLAVIA WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN ORGANIZING THE MODERATES. AND SO LONG AS HE IS ON THE SCENE HIS VERY PRESENCE AS THE LAST OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS OF NON-ALIGNMENT WILL CARRY GREAT WEIGHT AND GIVE YUGOSLAVIA A SIGNIFICANCE WITHIN THE NAM OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO ITS INTRINSIC WORTH. BUT WHEN HE IS GONE YUGOSLAVIA'S ROLE WITHIN THE NON-ALIGNED--ITS MORAL INFLUENCE IF YOU WILL--A WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY REDUCED. THE NEW YUGOSLAV LADERSHIP, WHOEVER IT MAY  
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BE, WILL CONTINUE TO PLACE GREAT EMPHASIS ON NON-ALIGNMENT. BUT IT WILL NOT HAVE THE TIME, THE ABILITY, OR THE REPUTATION TO USE OR INFLUENCE THE MOVEMENT AS EFFECTIVELY AS HAS TITO.

15. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT OTHERS SUCH AS INDIA, SRI LANKA, AND INDONESIA, TO NAME A FEW, WILL NOT -- WITH YUGOSLAVIA -- CONTINUE TO OPPOSE CASTRO. BUT THE PASSING OF TITO--PARTICULARLY IF IT SHOULD OCCUR WITHIN THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS-- WOULD GREATLY WEAKEN THE MODERATES AT AN IMPORTANT TIME, WHILE STRENGTHENING CASTRO'S POSITION.

VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S.-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS.

16. THE PAST SIX TO EIGHT MONTHS HAVE SEEN SOME RATHER INTERESTING DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AS THEY RELATE TO NON-ALIGNMENT. SECRETARY MINIC'S SILENT ACQUIESCENCE IN OUR APPROACHES TO FRIENDS WITHIN THE NAM ON THE CUBAN QUESTION (UNLIKE SOME OTHER MEMBERS, THE GOY HAS NEVER COMPLAINED--PUBLICLY OR PRIVATELY-- ABOUT THE DEMARCHES WE MADE) WAS SIGNIFICANT. THIS WAS FLOWED LATER BY A YUGOSLAV "SUGGESTION" THAT PRESIDENT CARTER SEND THE CONFERENCE A MESSAGE AND THAT THE USG PERSUADE THE SAUDIS TO ATTEND. WE DID

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BOTH, AND BOTH HAVE BEEN GRATEFULLY (IF PRIVATELY) NOTED  
BY THE GOY.

17. THE YUGOSLAVS WOULD BE HIGHLY EMBARRASSED WERE ANY  
OF THESE FACTS TO BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE (AND WOULD  
DENY THEM VOCIFEROUSLY). BUT THEY SEEM TO INDICATE  
A GROWING, ALTHOUGH PERHAPS TEMPORARY, CONFIDENCE IN THE  
BENIGN INTENTIONS OF THE USG TOWARD NONALIGNMENT, AND  
A RECOGNITION THAT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S MORE  
SYMPATHETIC VIEW OF THE NAM IS SINCERE. THIS STANDS  
IN STARK CONTRAST TO THE YUGOSLAV VIEW OF THE SOVIET UNION.

18. YUGOSLAV-USSR RELATIONS ARE IN A BAD STATE OF  
DISREPAIR, AND GROWING WORSE. TO THE YUGOSLAVS THE  
CUBANS ARE LITTLE MORE THAN THE SOVIET TROJAN HORSE IN  
THE MIDST OF THE NONALIGNED; IT IS THE SOVIETS WHO ARE  
REALLY CHALLENGING THE YUGOSLAV CONCEPT OF NON-  
ALIGNMENT. AND SINCE THE GOY HAS ALWAYS SEEN THE  
MOVEMENT AS A MAJOR MEANS OF DEFENDING ITS INDEPENDENCE  
FROM MOSCOW, A CHALLENGE FROM THAT DIRECTION PLAYS ON  
BELGRADE'S PARANOIA AS LITTLE ELSE CAN. (WHETHER THE  
WORSENING OF YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS IS A CONSEQUENCE  
OF WHAT THE GOY PERCEIVES AS THE MOSCOW-HAVANA ATTACK ON  
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NONALIGNMENT, OR A CAUSE, IS NOT CLEAR. IT IS  
PROBABLY BOTH A CAUSE AND AN EFFECT, I.E., ONLY ONE  
OF A SERIES OF ELEMENTS AFFECTING AND BEING AFFECTED  
BY THE DETERIORATING RELATIONSHIP.)

19. IN ANY EVENT, WE MAY BE ABLE TO USE THESE TWO  
FACTORS -- INCREASING CONFIDENCE IN US MOTIVES, AND  
GROWING DISTRUST OF THE USSR, TO:  
-- STRENGTHEN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH YUGOSLAVIA;  
-- MODERATE OUR DIFFERENCES WITH, AND MODESTLY INCREASE  
OUR INFLUENCE ON, A PART OF THE NAM.

20. YUGOSLAV RECEPTIVITY TO A STRENGTHENING OF TIES  
WITH THE US IS, AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THE BELGRADE  
CONFERENCE, PROBABLY EVEN GREATER THAN IT WAS AT THE  
TIME OF THE TITO VISIT; WE SHOULD TAKE  
ADVANTAGE OF IT. WE SHOULD CONTINUE WHAT WE HAVE  
ALREADY BEGUN: THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSTITUTIONAL TIES  
IN THE ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND CULTURAL FIELDS, AND THE

DEEPENING OF OUR POLITICAL DIALOGUE. THE CARTER-TITO CORRESPONDENCE SHOULD BE RESUMED, AND WE SHOULD DEVELOP A SIMILAR RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECRETARIES VANCE AND VRHOVEC (WE WILL HAVE SUGGESTIONS ON THIS BY SEPTTEL).

21. WITH REGARD TO THE NAM, WE MAY HAVE BEFORE US AN OPPORTUNITY -- WORKING THROUGH AND WITH THE YUGOSLAVS -- TO EXERT A MODESTLY GREATER DEGREE OF INFLUENCE THAN IN THE PAST. IF WE OVERPLAY THE HAND WE WILL DO BOTH OURSELVES AND THE YUGOSLAVS NOTHING BUT HARM, SO WE NEED TO APPROACH THE QUESTION WITH GREAT CAUTION. AND WE WILL NEED TO RECOGNIZE FROM THE OUTSET THAT THE CONGRUENCE OF OUR NAM INTERESTS WITH THOSE OF THE GOY WILL, AT BEST, BE ON A NARROW RANGE OF COMMON INTERESTS.  
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22. BUT THERE MAY WELL BE SOME AREAS WHERE WE CAN WORK TOGETHER, AND WE SHOULD -- VERY GENTLY -- LET THE GOY KNOW THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO HELP AS WE DID BEFORE THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE IF THEY NEED US. IT SHOULD THEN BE UP TO THEM TO ACCEPT THE OFFER IF THEY WISH;  
WE WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE TO JUDGE FOR OURSELVES WHETHER IT WOULD BE IN OUR INTERESTS TO RESPOND TO ANY REQUESTS THEY MIGHT MAKE. WE MIGHT ALSO THINK ABOUT DEVELOPING AN INFORMAL DIALOGUE ON ISSUES THAT WILL ARISE AT HAVANA. THE VEHICLE MIGHT, IN SOME CASES, BE THE CARTER-TITO, VANCE-VRHOVEC CHANNEL; IN OTHER CASES THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON OR THIS EMBASSY MIGHT BE THE APPROPRIATE CHANNEL. THESE ARE BUT SUGGESTIONS; THE MAIN POINT IS THAT THE USG SHOULD GIVE THOUGHT TO WHETHER IT SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE CURRENT STATE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP TO ATTEMPT TO INFLUENCE YUGOSLAV ATTITUDES IN WAYS THAT MAY PAY OFF FOR US, IF ONLY marginally, IN HAVANA, AND IF SO, HOW.  
EAGLEBURGER

SECRET

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## Message Attributes

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**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 07 jun 2005  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 1589212  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** THE BELGRADE NONALIGNED FOREIGN MINISTERS CONFERENCE AND YUGOSLAVIA: EMBASSY ASSESSMENT  
**TAGS:** PEPR, PFOR, YO  
**To:** STATE INFO USUN NY  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/6fd6f759-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014